While coaches have come to expect a certain amount of verbal abuse from overzealous fans or upset parents as an unfortunate part of the job, they do not typically receive such abuse from their own administrators or colleagues. Even in cases where a coach is about to be fired, administrators still need to be careful about what they say in public.
A good case that illustrates the danger administrators face because of defamation laws when disciplining or firing coaches is Cruce v. Berkeley County School District, 896 S.E.2d 765 (S.C. 2024).
Going for it
Jeffrey Cruce was the head football coach and athletic director for Berkeley High School in Moncks Corner, S.C. For the 2015 season, he adopted a controversial “no punt” offensive scheme for the football team. This strategy stirred intense debate among followers of the team and was covered in local and even national sports pages. The controversy deepened as the team suffered lopsided defeats.
At the end of the season, the Berkeley County School District sent Cruce a letter advising him that he was being removed as coach and athletic director and reassigned to a position as a middle school guidance counselor because he had failed to meet certain performance goals.
On Jan. 7, 2016, Berkeley athletic trainer Chris Stevens sent an email to 45 people, including administrators, athletic department employees and volunteer coaches, questioning the completeness of student-athlete files Cruce had maintained. In the email, Stevens remarked the filing issues were a potential “liability” to the district.
The next day, the district sent Cruce a letter upholding his reassignment. Although Cruce completed the rest of the year at the middle school, he resigned at the end of the school year, noting in his resignation letter how the district had humiliated him and destroyed his career by removing him from his coaching and athletic director positions without any public explanation. Moreover, Cruce claimed he could not find a suitable coaching job — or even a position as a volunteer coach — because of the district’s actions.
As a result, Cruce filed a lawsuit against the district, alleging wrongful termination and defamation. His defamation claim was based on several things, including Stevens’ email.
The trial court granted the district a directed verdict on Cruce’s wrongful termination claim. The trial court also granted the district a directed verdict as to his defamation claim, except the portion of the claim related to Stevens’ email.
In considering the defamation claim based on Stevens’ email, the trial court rejected the district’s argument that Cruce was a public figure and therefore had to show actual malice. The jury awarded Cruce $200,000.
On appeal, the court of appeals found that Cruce was a public official due to his status as a high school football coach and athletic director. Since he was deemed a public official, the court held Cruce was required to prove actual malice, a requirement that barred his claim due to the district’s immunity from loss arising from employee conduct constituting actual malice.
Are coaches public figures?
On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that while it had considered the public official designation in numerous defamation cases, it had not considered whether a high school football coach or athletic director is a public official in the defamation context. The district insisted that Cruce is a public official, pointing to his public employment and the enormous array of newspaper articles about him and his unorthodox coaching strategies, as well as his appearances in other media, including a regular radio show.
In rejecting the district claim, the court noted that while he was a public employee and enjoyed media attention akin to that of many sports figures, that did not transform him into a public official, a classification that would strip him of his right to protect his name from being defamed to the same extent as a private citizen. No matter how intense the public gaze may be upon sports figures, the court held they do not have any official influence or decision-making authority about serious issues of public policy or core government functions, such as defense, public health and safety, budgeting, infrastructure, taxation, or law and order. The court therefore held that Cruce was not a public official.
If not a public official, the district argued that Cruce was a public figure. To determine whether someone is a limited public figure, a category that describes one who “voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues,” the Supreme Court of South Carolina used a three-part test. This involved determining 1) whether the plaintiff voluntarily injected himself into and played a prominent role in a public controversy, defined as a controversy whose resolution affects a substantial segment of the public, 2) whether the defamation occurred after the plaintiff voluntarily entered the controversy but while still embroiled in it, and 3) whether the defamation was related to the controversy.
Based on this test, the Supreme Court of South Carolina concluded that Cruce is not a limited public figure. In support of this finding, the court found no public controversy was present. The merit of Cruce’s coaching strategy was not a controversy that affected large segments of society. In addition, the court held that even if a public controversy existed over Cruce’s coaching strategy, Stevens’ defamatory comments related to Cruce’s paperwork skills, not his gridiron acumen.
False and defamatory
Finally, the district argued that even if the court concluded that Cruce was neither a public official nor a public figure, Cruce still failed to prove the content of Stevens’ email was defamatory. The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that to prevail on a defamation claim, Cruce bore the burden of proving the district or its agent published a defamatory and unprivileged statement about him to others; that the district was at fault (in the sense it was at least negligent); and that he suffered damages because of the statement.
In finding that Cruce met the first element, the court held that a statement is defamatory if it tends to harm one’s reputation, to lower him in the esteem of his community or to deter others from dealing or associating with him. A statement may be deemed nondefamatory as a matter of law only if it is incapable of being interpreted as defamatory by any reasonable construction.
In reviewing Stevens’ email, the court held that a reasonable person could read it as suggesting Cruce was incompetent and unfit to perform the administrative duties of his position. In addition, the court noted that the “liability” buzzword added a suggestion of not just incompetence but illegality.
Next, the district argued that even if the statement was defamatory, there was no evidence Stevens’ comments about the files were false. Truth, the district argued, is an absolute defense in any defamation claim. However, the court held that common law presumed a defamatory communication to be false and that the defendant has the burden of proving falsity. The court found that the district failed to prove that the email statements were true to the jury. In particular, the court noted that the files and record-keeping had recently passed a state audit.
As for whether the district was at fault or negligent, the court had to consider the district’s claim that Cruce failed to prove Stevens acted with such recklessness as to show conscious disregard of another’s rights. The court found that the record demonstrates Stevens could have been reckless. There was testimony indicating Stevens was not authorized to review student-athlete files, nor was he trained to know the applicable requirements. Still, he rummaged through the files and broadcast his belief about their integrity to 45 of Cruce’s peers. After declaring the files were incomplete or out of order, he reported he would continue reviewing them over the next few days “to make sure the correct files are in place.” This remark showed Stevens’ review of the files before sending the email was cursory and incomplete.
Finally, the court held that Cruce had to show either general damages, or that the publication caused Cruce special harm. In upholding the jury’s damages award, the court found that Cruce’s reputation was ruined due to the district’s conduct toward him and that he could not find another job in coaching, that he was “shunned,” and that there was a “black mark” on his name. Having lost on appeal, the school district was liable for the $200,000 damage award.
Administrators on alert
What can other athletics administrators take away from the Cruce case?
First, the question of whether a coach is a limited public figure is a state-by-state determination. Therefore, while binding in South Carolina, the case is not binding in other states. Other states, however, are free to adopt the South Carolina court’s reasoning. Administrators in all states, therefore, need to be careful about what they say publicly about employees since they may or may not be a limited public figure.
Second, while the truth is an absolute defense in all defamation cases, common law presumes all defamatory statements are false. Therefore, as illustrated in the Cruce case, even if everything in the email about the coach and AD was true, the burden of showing that the statements are true is on the defendant, and it’s the duty of the jury to determine if they are, in fact, true.
